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content.tex
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content.tex
@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ Taking down a \ac{p2p} botnet requires intricate knowledge of the botnet's chara
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Just like for centralized and decentralized botnets, to take down a \ac{p2p} botnet, the \ac{c2} channel needs to be identified and disrupted.
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By \emph{monitoring} peer activity of known participants in the botnet, this knowledge can be obtained and used to find attack vectors in the botnet protocol.
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\todo{few words about monitoring}
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In this work, we will show how a collaborative system of crawlers and sensors can make the monitoring and information gathering phase of a \ac{p2p} botnet more efficient, resilient to detection and how collaborative monitoring can help circumvent anti-monitoring techniques.
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%}}} introduction
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@ -233,7 +231,6 @@ They depend on suspicious graph properties to enumerate candidate peers~\cite{bi
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\Ac{bms} is intended for a hybrid active approach of crawlers and sensors (reimplementations of the \ac{p2p} protocol of a botnet, that won't perform malicious actions) to collect live data from active botnets.
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In an earlier project, we implemented different graph ranking algorithms---among others \emph{PageRank}~\cite{bib:page_pagerank_1998} and \emph{SensorRank}---to detect sensor candidates in a botnet, as described in \citetitle{bib:karuppayah_sensorbuster_2017}.
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In an earlier project, we implemented the ranking algorithms described in \citetitle{bib:karuppayah_sensorbuster_2017} for \ac{bms}.
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%%{{{ detection criteria
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%\subsection{Detection Criteria}
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@ -366,7 +363,7 @@ To keep the distribution as even as possible, we keep track of the last crawler
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For the sake of simplicity, only the bandwidth will be considered as a capability but it can be extended by any shared property between the crawlers, \eg{} available memory or processing power.
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For a given crawler \(c_i \in C\) let \(cap(c_i)\) be the capability of the crawler.
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The total available capability is \(B = \sum\limits_{c \in C} cap(c)\).
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With \(G\) being the greatest common divisor of all the crawler's capabilities, the weight \(W(c_i) = \frac{cap(c_i)}{G}\).
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With \(G\) being the greatest common divisor of all the crawler's capabilities, the weight of a crawler is \(W(c_i) = \frac{cap(c_i)}{G}\).
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\(\frac{cap(c_i)}{B}\) gives us the percentage of the work a crawler is assigned.
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% The set of target peers \(P = <p_0, p_1, \ldots, p_{n-1}>\), is partitioned into \(|C|\) subsets according to \(W(c_i)\) and each subset is assigned to its crawler \(c_i\).
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% The mapping \mintinline{go}{gcd(C)} is the greatest common divisor of all peers in \mintinline{go}{C}, \(\text{maxWeight}(C) = \max \{ \forall c \in C : W(c) \}\).
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@ -421,7 +418,8 @@ Given the hash function \(H\), calculating the hash of an IP address and distrib
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This gives us the mapping \(m(i) = H(i) \mod \abs{C}\) to sort peers into buckets.
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Any hash function can be used but since it must be calculated often, a fast function should be used.
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While the \ac{md5} hash function must be considered broken for cryptographic use~\cite{bib:stevensCollision}, it is faster to calculate than hash functions with longer output.\todo{md5 crypto broken, distribution not?}
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While the \ac{md5} hash function must be considered broken for cryptographic use~\cite{bib:stevensCollision}, it is faster to calculate than hash functions with longer output.
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Collisions for \ac{md5} have been found but collision resistance is not required.
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For the use case at hand, only the uniform distribution property is required so \ac{md5} can be used without scarifying any kind of security.
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This strategy can also be weighted using the crawlers' capabilities by modifying the list of available workers so that a worker can appear multiple times according to its weight.
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@ -554,7 +552,7 @@ While the effective frequency of the whole system is halved compared to~\Fref{fi
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\subsection{Creating and Reducing Edges for Sensors}
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\citetitle*{bib:karuppayah_sensorbuster_2017} describes different graph metrics to find sensors in \ac{p2p} botnets.
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These metrics depend on the uneven ratio between incoming and outgoing edges for crawlers.
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These metrics depend on the uneven ratio between incoming and outgoing edges for sensors.
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The \emph{SensorBuster} metric uses \acp{wcc} since naive sensors don't have any edges back to the main network in the graph.
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@ -609,7 +607,7 @@ The following candidates to place on the neighbor list will be investigated:
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\textbf{Other Sensors:} Returning all the other sensors when responding to peer list requests, thereby effectively creating a complete graph \(K_{\abs{C}}\) among the workers, creates valid outgoing edges.
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The resulting graph will still form a \ac{wcc} with now edges back into the main network.
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Building a complete graph \(G_C = K_{\abs{C}}\) between the sensors by making them return the other known worker on peer list requests would still produce a disconnected component and while being bigger and maybe not as obvious at first glance, it is still easily detectable since there is no path from \(G_C\) back to the main network (see~\Fref{fig:sensorbuster2} and~\Fref{tab:metricsTable}).\todo{where?}
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Building a complete graph \(G_C = K_{\abs{C}}\) between the sensors by making them return the other known worker on peer list requests would still produce a disconnected component and while being bigger and maybe not as obvious at first glance, it is still easily detectable since there is no path from \(G_C\) back to the main network (see~\Fref{fig:sensorbuster2} and~\Fref{tab:metricsTable}).
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%{{{ churned peers
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@ -906,7 +904,7 @@ This is good enough for balancing the tasks among workers.
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%{{{ eval redu requ freq
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\subsection{Reduction of Request Frequency}
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To evaluate the request frequency optimization described in \Fref{sec:stratRedReqFreq}, crawl a simulated peer and check if the requests are evenly distributed and how big the deviation from the theoretically optimal result is.
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To evaluate the request frequency optimization described in \Fref{sec:stratRedReqFreq}, we crawl a simulated peer and check if the requests are evenly distributed and how big the deviation from the theoretically optimal result is.
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To get more realistic results, the crawlers and simulated peer are running on different machines so they are not within the same LAN\@.
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We use the same parameters as in the example above:
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@ -999,7 +997,7 @@ With this experiment, we try to estimate the impact of the latency.
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\caption{Average deviation per crawler}\label{tab:perCralwerDeviation}
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\end{table}
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The monitored peer crawler \emph{c0} are located in Falkenstein, Germany, \emph{c1} in Nurnberg, Germany, \emph{c2} is in Helsinki, Finland and \emph{c3} in Ashburn, USA, to have some geographic distribution.
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The monitored peer and crawler \emph{c0} are located in Falkenstein, Germany, \emph{c1} in Nurnberg, Germany, \emph{c2} is in Helsinki, Finland and \emph{c3} in Ashburn, USA, to have some geographic distribution.
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The average deviation per crawler is below \SI{0.002}{\second} even with some outliers due to network latency or server load.
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The crawler \emph{c3} in the experiment is the furthest away from the monitored host therefore the larger derivation due to network latency is expected.
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@ -1090,7 +1088,7 @@ SensorBuster relies on the assumption that sensors don't have any outgoing edges
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For the \ac{wcc} metric, it is obvious that even a single edge back into the main network is enough to connect the sensor back to the main graph and therefore beat this metric.
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\subsubsection{Effectiveness against Page- and SensorRank}
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\subsection{Reducing Incoming Edges to Reduce Page- and SensorRank}
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In this section, we will evaluate how adding outgoing edges to a sensor impacts its PageRank and SensorRank values.
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Before doing so, we will check the impact of the initial rank by calculating it with different initial values and comparing the value distribution of the result.
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@ -1268,11 +1266,11 @@ Experiments were performed, in which the incoming edges for the known sensor are
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\end{figure}
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\end{landscape}
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\Fref{fig:pr0} and \Fref{fig:sr0} show the situation on the base truth without modifications.
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The graphs with 0 removed edges show the situation on the base truth without modifications.
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We can see in \Fref{fig:prFiltered} and \Fref{fig:srFiltered}, that we have to reduce the incoming edges by \SI{20}{\percent} and \SI{30}{\percent} respectively to get average values for SensorRank and PageRank.
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This also means that the number of incoming edges for a sensor must be about the same as the average about of incoming edges as can be seen in \Fref{fig:in3}.
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This also means that the number of incoming edges for a sensor must be about the same as the average about of incoming edges.
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Depending on the protocol details of the botnet (\eg{} how many incoming edges are allowed per peer), this means that a large amount of sensors is needed if we want to monitor the whole network.
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@ -1343,7 +1341,7 @@ The server-side part of the system consists of a \ac{grpc} server to handle the
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\section{Conclusion}
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Collaborative monitoring of \ac{p2p} botnets allows circumventing some anti-monitoring efforts.
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It also enables more effective monitoring systems for larger botnets, since each peer can be visited by only one crawler.
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We were able to show, that it also enables more effective monitoring systems for larger botnets, since each peer can be visited by only one crawler.
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The current concept of independent crawlers in \ac{bms} can also use multiple workers but there is no way to ensure a peer is not watched by multiple crawlers thereby using unnecessary resources.
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We were able to show, that a collaborative monitoring approach for \ac{p2p} botnets helps to circumvent anti-monitoring and monitoring detection mechanisms and is helpful to improve resource usage when monitoring large botnets.
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@ -1363,15 +1361,16 @@ This might bring some performance issues to light which can be solved by investi
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Another way to expand on this work is automatically scaling the available crawlers up and down, depending on the botnet size and the number of concurrently online peers.
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Doing so would allow a constant crawl interval for even highly volatile botnets.
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Autoscaling features offered by many cloud-computing providers can be evaluated to automatically add or remove crawlers based on the monitoring load, a botnet's size, and the number of active peers.
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This should also allow the creation of workers with new IP addresses in different geolocations in a fast, easy and automated way.
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This also requires investigating hosting providers which allow botnet crawling by their terms of use.
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The current backend implementation assumes an immutable set of crawlers.
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For autoscaling to work, efficient reassignment of peers has to be implemented to account for added or removed workers.
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Placing churned peers or peers with suspicious network activity (those behind carrier-grade \acp{nat}) might just offer another characteristic to flag sensors in a botnet.
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The feasibility of this approach should be investigated and maybe there are ways to mitigate this problem.
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Autoscaling features offered by many cloud-computing providers can be evaluated to automatically add or remove crawlers based on the monitoring load, a botnet's size, and the number of active peers.
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This should also allow the creation of workers with new IP addresses in different geolocations in a fast, easy and automated way.
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The current implementation assumes an immutable set of crawlers.
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For autoscaling to work, efficient reassignment of peers has to be implemented to account for added or removed workers.
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%}}} further work
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%{{{ acknowledgments
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@ -12,10 +12,12 @@
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\studyprogramme{Master Informatik}
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%\startingdate{1.\,November 2088}
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%\closingdate{11.\,Dezember 2089}
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\startingdate{2021-12-01}
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\closingdate{2022-05-01}
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\firstadvisor{Prof.\ Dr.\ Christoph Skornia}
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\secondadvisor{Prof.\ Dr.\ Thomas Waas}
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%\externaladvisor{Dr. Klara Endlos}
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\externaladvisor{Leon Böck}
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\date{\today}
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% \date{}
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@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ headsepline,
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\usepackage[pdftex,colorlinks=false]{hyperref}
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% make overfull hbox warnings prominently visible in document
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\overfullrule=2cm
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% \overfullrule=2cm
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\pagestyle{headings}
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@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ headsepline,
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\clearpage{}
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\listoftodos{}
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% \listoftodos{}
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\include{content}
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